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ABSTRACT 
Existing literature argues that loan loss provisions are subject to managerial discretion and commonly associated with the 
issues of income smoothing, capital management, signaling and pro-cyclicality. The main objective of this study is to 
examine the evidence of income smoothing, capital management, signaling, and pro-cyclical behavior through loan loss 
provisions of Malaysian commercial banks for period 2002-2012. Using a sample of 15 commercial banks, the results 
indicate that Malaysian commercial banks do smooth income through loan loss provisions while on the other hand, no 
conclusive evidence to support that Malaysian commercial banks manage capital through loan loss provisions. As for the 
signaling and pro-cyclicality, no concrete evidence to support Malaysian commercial banks engages in signaling activities 
and pro-cyclicality through loan loss provisions. This study also controls for the effect of 2007-2009 global financial crisis 
on loan loss provisioning of Malaysian commercial banks. The results indicate that Malaysian commercial banks put aside 
more provisions during the financial crisis.   
 
Keywords: Income Smoothing, Capital Management, Signaling, Pro-Cyclical, Loan Loss Provisions, Malaysian Banks, Financial 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Loan and advances are the largest assets of 
banking institutions where lending is the main activity to 
generate income. Foos, Norden, and Weber (2010) 
emphasize that loans represent an important driver of the 
riskiness of banks and are the main source of credit risk. 
Credit risk is the potential financial loss resulting from the 
failure of the customer or counterparty to settle the 
financial and contractual obligations to the bank. In this 
respect, banking institutions and bank regulator should 
monitor closely the lending activity as poor monitoring in 
loan activity may lead to bank failure.  
 
To protect from severe loan losses, the banking 
institutions are permitted to make a reserve for the future 
loan losses based on their recent loan loss experience 
from their flows of incomes. It is called as an allowance 
for loan losses. Bank should maintain sufficient loan loss 
allowances to cover expected losses and maintain equity 
capital to absorb unexpected losses (Benston and Wall, 
2005). The deductions of allowance for loan losses will 
appear on the bank’s income and expenses statement as 
non-cash expense item called provision for loan losses.  
 
A loan loss provision is an expense item that 
bank and selected financial institutions may deduct from 
its current income. It is charged to the bank profit and loss 
statements that create reserves on bank balance sheets to 
prevent losses. The loan loss provisions are the main 
accrual expenses for banks (Rose and Hudgins, 2013). 
Thus, banks tend to manipulate provision for loan loss as 
a tool for earnings management, capital management, and 
signaling. In addition, loan loss provisions may also  
 
associated with the pro-cyclical behavior of the banking 
institutions. 
 
The case of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
(BIMB) in year 2006 provides a good example regarding 
the manipulation of loan loss provision to achieve targeted 
earnings. The bank was predicted to make provisions not 
more than RM1.5 billion on non-performing loan (NPL) 
for the financial year ending June 2006. However, BIMB 
recorded the amount of RM774 million in loan loss 
provisions for the previous financial year, which resulted 
to a surprising amount of RM2.3 billion in the loan loss 
provisions (LLP) in year 2006. Due to this, public 
confidence had dropped (Ram, 2006).  
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
There are rising numbers of studies that debated 
the manipulation of loan loss provisions for income 
smoothing, capital management, signaling and pro-
cyclicality. Income smoothing can be defined as 
manipulating an accrual item in the income statement to 
smooth the bank’s reported earnings. It occurs when bank 
managers understate expected loan losses to increase net 
income and capital in the current year (Benston and Wall, 
2005). 
 
Capital management occurs when the capital 
constrained, banks will use the loan loss provisions to 
achieve regulatory capital targets. Signaling occurs when 
bank managers increase current loan loss provisions to 
signal the future earnings power of the bank. Pro-
cyclicality happens when bank managers increase their 
provisions during bad times and reduce them in good 
times. The implication of pro-cyclicality is that it may 
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trigger a credit crunch that could worsen the economics 
recession. 
 
There are a number of literatures that investigate 
the use of loan loss provisions to smooth income and 
manage capital. Anandarajan et al., (2007), Perez et al., 
(2008), Chang et al., (2008), Fonseca and Gonza’lez 
(2008) and Kanagaretnam et al., (2010) highlight that 
banks use loan loss provisions to smooth income and for 
capital management. There are also recent literature that 
examine the use of loan loss provision for income 
smoothing and capital management such as DeBoskey 
and Jiang (2012), Dong et al., (2012), Curcio and Hasan 
(2013), Bouvatier at al., (2014), and Olson and Zoubi 
(2014). Most of these studies employ the U.S. banks data 
and European banks data. 
 
The other strand of literature associate loan loss 
provisions with the issue of signaling (Kanagaretnam et 
al., 2005; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Leventis et al., 2012; 
Curcio and Hasan, 2013; and Olson and Zoubi, 2014).  
Existing studies also highlight that loan loss provisioning 
is commonly associated with the pro-cyclicality (Bikker 
and Hu, 2002; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Berger and 
Udell, 2004; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier 
and Lepetit, 2008; and Suhartono, 2012). 
 
Most of the studies on loan loss provisions are 
done in the United States and countries outside Malaysia. 
For Malaysian case, Shaharudin (2004) reviews past 
academic literatures on manipulating loan loss provisions 
for earnings and capital management and concludes that 
banks in Malaysia do not manage their regulatory capital 
and earnings through loan loss provisions. This is 
supported by Ismail et al., (2005), where the empirical 
analysis suggests that Malaysian banks do not smooth 
income through loan loss provisions.  
 
This study differs from Shaharudin (2004) and 
Ismail et al., (2005) in several ways. First, this study 
provides more recent evidence on the use of loan loss 
provisions for income smoothing, capital management, 
and signaling in Malaysian commercial banks.  Second, 
this study tests whether pro-cyclicality exists through loan 
loss provisions in Malaysian commercial banks, an issue 
that receives little attention in the existing literature. 
Third, this study controls for the effect of 2007-2009 
global financial crises on loan loss provisions of 
Malaysian commercial banks. Therefore, the objectives of 
this study are: 
 
i) To examine the evidence of income smoothing, 
capital management, signaling, and pro-cyclical 
behavior through loan loss provisions of 
Malaysian commercial banks for the period 
2002-2012. 
ii) To examine the effect of 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis on loan loss provisions of 
Malaysian commercial banks. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Bank Loan Loss Provisioning 
Loan loss provisions are defined as estimation 
for probability of loan losses. This amount will be charged 
on income statement as an expense. The aim is to protect 
a portion of current earnings from taxes in preparing for 
default loans. Loan loss provisions play important role 
due to the sensitive information they convey and may 
reflect the deteriorations of credit portfolio quality 
(Curcio and Hasan, 2013). Banking institution should 
establish a scientific and rational system of loan loss 
provisions to address financial risk (Dong, Liu, and Hu, 
2012). Generally, there are two categories for loan loss 
provisions; specific provisions and general provisions. 
Specific provisions refer to the expected losses for 
individual or specific loans that have been recognized as 
an impaired. While, general provisions defined as groups 
of loans that have not been identified as impaired but may 
possibility contain some. 
 
Loan loss allowance is a contra assets accounts 
that represent an accrued reserve against loans losses. 
When a loan is considered uncollectible, the amount will 
be charged off by reducing the allowance for loan losses 
account and at the same time decreasing the asset account 
for gross loans. The increase in loan loss provisions will 
result in increase of loan loss allowance and a reduction in 
current net income.  
 
2.2 Loan Loss Provisions and Income Smoothing and 
Capital Management 
Income smoothing is a common form of earnings 
management. It can be defined as manipulating an accrual 
item in the income statement to smooth the firm’s 
reported earnings. The need of income smoothing arises 
due to the need to reduce the information asymmetry. It 
occurs when bank managers understate expected loan 
losses to increase net income and capital in the current 
year (Benston and Wall, 2005). Meanwhile, capital 
management is when capital becomes a constrained; bank 
will use its discretionary accruals to achieve regulatory 
capital targets.  Capital ratio is an important indicator that 
reflects the risk of the bank. It plays an important role to 
shows the bank’s ability to endure under current capital 
structure and denotes the undetectable risk of default 
(Chang et al., 2008).  
 
Study by Anandarajan et al., (2007) reveals that 
Australian banks use loan loss provisions for capital 
management. The result also indicate that banks in 
Australia use loan loss provisions to manage earnings 
were listed commercial banks engaged aggressively in 
earnings management as compared to unlisted commercial 
banks. Perez et al., (2008) on the other hand, examine the 
impact of statistical provisions on loan loss provisions of 
banks in Spain. The findings show that, even though strict 
regulations on loan loss provisions have been imposed, it 
appears that Spanish banks still practice income 
smoothing activities. However, there is no evidence to 
prove that they use loan loss provisions to manage capital. 
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Fonseca and Gonza’lez (2008) examine the determinants 
of income smoothing via the manipulation of bank loan 
loss provision using panel data of 40 countries around the 
world. The findings suggest that bank income smoothing 
depends on investor protection, disclosure, regulation and 
supervision, financial structure and financial 
development. 
 
In the recent study of earnings management and 
capital management in the banking industry, 
Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2010) examine the impact 
of auditor reputation on banks’ earnings management by 
utilizing samples from international banks in 29 countries. 
Being the first of its kind to study the impact of auditing 
on bank earnings management, the authors hypothesize 
that auditors who are specialists in the banking industry 
may have better assess the adequacy of loan losses and 
able to reduce earnings management activities through 
loan loss provisions. Covering period from 1993 to 2006, 
their tests on income-increasing abnormal loan loss 
provisions suggest that auditor type and auditor expertise 
could hinder the activities of earnings management 
through abnormal loan loss provisions.  
 
DeBoskey and Jiang (2012) examine the impact 
of auditor specialization on banking loan loss provisions 
by utilizing large cross section of U.S banks. Covering 
period from 2002 to 2006, they suggest that bank manager 
use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings in the post-
SOX period.  Similar result obtained by Kanagaretnam et 
al., (2010), the audit industry expertise plays an affective 
monitoring role in reducing earnings management. Dong 
et al., (2012) provide evidence that there is relation 
between bank loan loss provision and earnings 
management and capital management in China banks. The 
results suggest that when bank capital adequacy is low, 
bank managers set aside more loan loss provision to add 
into capital in order to meet the regulatory requirements.  
 
In the recent study on the impact of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on loan loss 
provisioning, Leventies et al., (2012) find no evidence to 
support capital management hypothesis in examining the 
impact of implementation of IFRS on the use of loan loss 
provision to manage bank capital. Their study focus on 
European listed banks for the period 1999 to 2008. In the 
aspect of earnings management hypothesis, the findings 
conclude that earnings management through loan loss 
provision is significantly reduced after the implementation 
of IFRS in 2005.  
 
In summary, empirical evidence from earlier 
studies indicates that banks generally use loan loss 
provisions to manage earnings. Manipulating activities 
happen because of the need to reduce the information 
asymmetry. Hence, the hypotheses regarding income 
smoothing and capital management are developed as 
follows: 
 
H1 =  Malaysian commercial banks do smooth 
income through loan loss provisions 
H2 = Malaysian commercial banks manage capital 
through loan loss provisions 
 
2.3  Loan Loss Provisions and Signaling 
Signaling occurs when bank managers intend to 
signal the financial strength of the banks. Signaling the 
earnings power of the bank has been proven to be able in 
absorbing future losses by increasing the current loan loss 
provision (Shaharudin, 2004 and Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
2008). According to Kanagaretnam et al., (2005), in order 
to reduce adverse selection component and thus their cost 
of capital, bank managers with high earnings variability 
are more likely to engage in signaling through loan loss 
provision. 
 
In relation to this, Anandarajan et al., (2007) 
examine the use of loan loss provisions for capital, 
earnings management, and signaling by Australian banks. 
They do not find conclusive evidence to support that 
Australian banks use loan loss provisions for signaling 
future intentions of higher earnings to investors. In 
contrast, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) find the evidence 
of signaling hypothesis in European banks sample for the 
period 1992 to 2004. 
 
Different from others, Leventis et al., (2012) 
investigate whether bank managers of countries in the 
European Union engage in signaling after the 
implementation of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) in 2005. The study could not find 
sufficient evidence to support that healthy banks engage 
in signaling behavior but banks that having financial 
distress tend to engage in signaling. Curcio and Hasan 
(2013) examine the use of loan loss provisions by 
European banks in earnings and capital management and 
signaling. Covering period from 1996 to 2006, the 
findings suggest that non-EA banks use loan loss 
provisions as a tool to convey information about their 
future earnings to the markets. This is not found for the 
EA banks. 
 
Olson and Zoubi (2014) examine the 
determinants of the allowance for loan losses (ALL) and 
loan loss provisions (LLP) of banks in the Middle East 
and North African (MENA) for the period 2000-2008. 
Using a sample of 75 banks of nine MENA countries, the 
results highlight that MENA banks do engage in signaling 
activities through ALL and LLP. 
 
In summary, empirical evidence from earlier 
studies indicates that banks generally use loan loss 
provisions for signaling. Therefore, the hypothesis is 
developed as follows:  
 
H3 = Malaysian commercial banks engage in 
signaling through loan loss provisions 
 
2.4  Loan Loss Provisions and Pro-Cyclicality 
Pro-cyclicality occurs when banks increase 
provisions during the bad times and reduce them in good 
times. In bad times, increasing loan loss provisions would 
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affect bank earnings, weakening its capital, and reducing 
its lending to creditworthy borrowers. In relation to this, 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) analyze the pro-cyclical 
pattern of banks around world, and as expected, the 
results support the evidence of pro-cyclical behavior of 
loan loss provisions. 
 
In the aspect of the pro-cyclicality of loan loss 
provisioning and bank capital, Majnoni and Cavallo 
(2001) investigate the effects of weak regulation in 
monitoring the loan loss provisioning practices that may 
strengthen the pro-cyclical behavior of bank capital. 
Using a sample of 36 countries covering period from 
1988-1999, the results show that the level of institutional 
development significantly affect loan loss provisioning 
practices across countries. In addition, they also suggest 
that provisioning practices should be incorporated as a 
component of capital regulation to help reducing the pro-
cyclical effects on bank capital. The shortage of a bank 
capital will reduce bank lending activities, which could 
lead to a credit crisis that may worsen the economic 
downturns.  
 
Bikker and Hu (2002) and Bikker and 
Metzemakers (2005) examine the pro-cyclical pattern 
under Basel I and Basel II. In their studies, they find that 
provisioning tend to be high when GDP growth is low. 
This reflects an increased in riskiness of credit portfolio 
when the business cycle turns downwards. This will also 
increase the risk of credit crunch. In other study, Bikker 
and Hu (2002) employ a sample of 26 OECD countries 
covering 1979-1999 period to test the relationship 
between banks provisioning and business cycle. Using 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inflation, and 
unemployment, the findings conclude that loan loss 
provisions are negatively related with GDP and inflation, 
but positively related with unemployment. 
 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) examine banks pro-
cyclical behavior for 186 European banks sample 
covering period from 1992 to 2004. They find that credit 
risk management without provisioning rules may have 
pro-cyclical effects. They also find that non-discretionary 
loan loss provisions have a significant relationship with 
the business cycle. The recent global crisis shows the 
importance of the pro-cyclicality in the financial sector. It 
weakens the banking institutions due to the changes in 
economy activities that potentially affecting financial 
stability and economic growth (Athansoglou et al., 2014).  
 
From the above studies, it can be concluded that 
bank loan loss provisioning tends to be pro-cyclical. Thus, 
the hypothesis is developed as follows: 
 
H4 = Malaysian commercial banks exhibit pro-





3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data 
This study uses bank accounting data extracted 
from income statement and balance sheets of the selected 
commercial banks operating in Malaysia. The banks 
financial information was obtained primarily from annual 
reports, where the annual reports were downloaded from 
the banks website. The macroeconomic data, Growth 
Domestic Product (GDP), was taken from the World Bank 
(World Development Indicators). The period of analysis 
covers from 2002 to 2012, which includes the global 
recession in 2007-2008. This could assess whether the 
crisis gives an impact to loan loss provisions of Malaysian 
commercial banks.  
 
3.2 Sample 
This study utilizes a sample of commercial banks 
in Malaysia. There are a total of 27 commercial banks 
operating in Malaysia, of which 8 are local banks and 19 
are foreign banks. However, only 8 local banks and 7 
foreign banks were selected due to lack of data on loan 
loss provision and some banks have less than 10 years of 
accounting data.  In addition, most of the foreign-owned 
banks do not disclose their loan loss provisions data. 
Therefore, the final sample comprises 15 commercial 
banks.   
 
3.3 Model 
To test the hypotheses, with some modification, 
this study follows the model developed by Anandarajan et 
al., (2007) and Curcio and Hasan (2013). The baseline 
model is as follows: 
 
LLPit = α + β1NPLit + β2CHLOANit + β3EBTPit +        
β4CHEBTPi, t+1 + β5LLAi, t-1 + β6WOit + β7CAPit +     
β8GDPt + β9GFCit + εit                   
                                                             
Where:  
 
LLPit = Loan loss provisions of bank i at year t / average 
total assets 
 
NPLit = Non-performing loan ratio of bank i at year t 
 
CHLOANit = Change in total loans outstanding of bank i 
at year t / average total assets 
 
EBTPit = Earnings before taxes and provisions of bank i at 
year t / average total assets 
 
CHEBTPi,t+1 = One year ahead change in earnings before 
taxes and provisions of bank i at year t / average total 
assets 
 
LLAi,t-1 = Beginning loan loss allowance of bank i at year 
t / average total assets 
 
WOit = Write offs of bank i at year t / average total assets 
CAPit = Total equity of bank i at year t / average total 
assets 
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GDPt = Growth Domestic Product growth rate at year t 
 
GFCit = Dummy for 2007-2009 financial crisis 
 
3.4  Variable Explanation  
 
3.4.1 Dependent Variable 
LLPit = loan loss provisions of bank i at year t / 
average total assets 
 
Previous studies employ loan loss provisions as 
dependent variables to test the evidence of management 
discretionary which are income smoothing, capital 
management, signaling and pro-cyclicality 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2005; Anandarajan et al., 2007; 
Leventis et al., 2012). Following previous studies, this 
study uses loan loss provisions scaled by average total 
asset as dependent variable.  
 
3.4.2 Independent Variables 
          NPLit = non-performing loan ratio of bank i at 
year t 
 
Non-performing loan is an important indicator in 
determining the loan default. The higher the non-
performing loan, the higher loan loss provision would be 
(Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Dong et al., 2012).  NPL is 
expected to have a positive relationship with loan loss 
provisions.  
 
CHLOANit = Change in total loans outstanding of bank i 
at year t / average total assets  
Change in total loans outstanding of bank is used as a 
proxy to measure default risk. The higher the loan growth, 
the higher the loan loss provisions would be. Thus, 
CHLOAN is expected to have a positive relationship with 
loan loss provisions (Dong et al., 2012 and Fonseca and 
Gonza´lez, 2008). 
 
EBTPit = Earnings before taxes and provisions of bank i 
at year t / average total assets 
EBTP is used to test the evidence of income smoothing 
activities in Malaysian commercial banks. The positive 
sign of EBTP indicates that bank use loan loss provisions 
to smooth income, where banks will increase loan loss 
provisions when net incomes fall. Ismail et al., (2005) and 
Shaharudin (2004) do not find evidence that Malaysian 
banks smooth income through loan loss provisions. 
Therefore, using recent period of data, this study 
examines whether Malaysian banks do smooth income 
through loan loss provisions.  
 
CHEBTPi,t+1 = One year ahead change in earnings before 
taxes and provisions of bank i at year t /  average total 
assets 
 
This variable is used to test for signaling, where 
banks use loan loss provisions to signal for future 
profitability. Signaling occurs when bank managers 
increase current loan loss provisions to signal the future 
earnings power of the bank. Therefore, CHEBTP is 
expected to positively related to loan loss provisions. 
 
LLAi,t-1 = Beginning loan loss allowance of bank i at year 
t / average total assets 
 
Beginning loan loss allowance is also used to 
measure default risk. A higher beginning loan loss 
allowance will require a lower LLP in the current period.  
 
Thus, beginning LLA is expected to have a 
negative relationship with loan loss provisions.   
 
WOit = Write offs of bank i at year t / average total assets 
Current loan charge-offs can provide information about 
future loan defaults. This variable is expected to have a 
positive relationship with loan loss provisions. 
 
CAPit = Total equity of bank i at year t / average total 
assets 
 
Capital ratio plays an important role as an 
indicator of risk status of the bank. It indicates bank’s 
ability to survive under current capital structure and 
implies the invisible risk of default (Chang et al., 2008). 
The negative coefficient for capital management 
hypothesis posit that bank managers with low regulatory 
capital have incentives to increase loan loss provisions 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2005; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; 
Leventis et al., 2012 and Curcio and Hasan, 2013). 
Therefore, CAP is expected to have a negative 
relationship with loan loss provisions. 
 
GDPt = Growth Domestic Product growth rate at time t 
Pro-cyclicality is associated with business cycle where 
banks tend to increase loan loss provisions during 
economic downturns. In this study, GDP growth is used to 
measure the business cycle. The relationship between 
GDP growth and LLP will provide evidence for pro-
cyclical behavior. A negative relationship implies that 
banks increase their loan loss provisions when the 
business cycle falls (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; 
Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). 
 
GFCit = Dummy for 2007-2009 global financial crisis (1 
for years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 0 for others) 
Bank failure has a relationship with financial crisis due to 
poor loan monitoring during pre-crisis periods as bankers 
tend to ease their credit standards during expansion. Eng 
and Nabar (2007) find that the Asian financial crisis in 
1997 has an effect on the loan loss variables in Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore. To see the potential impact of 
2007-2009 financial crisis on Malaysian banks loan loss 
provisions, this study adds 2007-2009 crisis dummy to see 
whether the recent financial crisis influence the way 
Malaysian commercial banks do their provisioning.  
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4.  FINDINGS 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Min Max Std Dev 
LLP 0.0026 0 0.0132 0.0020 
LLA 0.0147 0.0007 0.0477 0.0076 
EBTP 0.0131 -0.0025 0.0269 0.0040 
CHEBTP 0.0011 -0.0202 0.0132 0.0034 
CHLOAN 0.0357 -13.60 0.2327 0.0382 
WO 0.0038 0 0.0238 0.0038 
CAP 0.0567 0.0235 0.1379 0.0187
NPL 3.713 0.14 21.25 3.8599
GDP 5.15 -1.51 7.43 2.23 
GFC 0.2727 0 1 0.4467 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in this study. The average value for loan 
loss provisions (LLP) is 0.26%, and for the loan loss 
allowance (LLA), the average value is 1.47%. On 
average, loan growth of banks in the sample (CHLOAN) 
is 3.57% for the entire period while the ratio of earnings 
before taxes and provision to total assets (EBTP) is 
1.31%. The average value for one year a head changes in 
earnings before taxes and provisions (CHEBTP) to total 
assets is 0.11%. The mean for non-performing loan ratio 
(NPL) is 3.17%. On average, write-off (WO) for the entire 
period is 0.38%, capital (CAP) is 5.67%, and GDP is 
5.15%. Finally, the mean value for GFC is 27.27%. 
 
The correlation matrix in Table 2 indicates that 
loan loss provisions (LLP) correlate positively with LLA, 
EBTP, WO, CAP, and NPL. On the other hand, loan loss 
provisions correlate negatively with CHEBTP, 
CHTLOAN GDP, and GFC. The correlation matrix also 
shows that multicollinearity does not appear to be a 
problem in the analysis as the highest correlation is 
around 60% between LLA and NPL. To further check for 
multicollinearity problem, variance inflation factor was 
also run. The results show that the mean VIF for 
independent variables is 1.75, satisfying the rule of thumb 
less than 10 (no multicollinearity problem). 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
 LLP LLA EBTP CHEBTP CHLOAN WO CAP NPL GDP GFC 
LLP 1.0000          
















0.0188 0.0880 1.0000      
WO 0.4032 0.5261 
-
0.1658 
-0.0625 -0.0925 1.0000     






1.0000    
NPL 0.3645 0.6011 
-
0.3581 







0.1647 0.1232 0.0149 
-
0.0235 
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4.2  Empirical Results 
 
 

































































Notes: LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets; NPL is the ratio of non-performing loan to total assets; 
CHLOAN is the ratio of change in loan to total assets; EBTP is the ratio of earnings before taxes and provision to total 
assets; CHEBTP is one year ahead change in earnings before taxes and provisions; LLA is the ratio of beginning balance 
of the total allowance for loan losses; WO is the ratio of write-offs to total assets; CAP is the ratio of total equity to total 
assets; GDP is growth domestic product; and GFC is dummy for crisis  years 2007-2009. 
 
Table 3 shows the empirical results of income 
smoothing, capital management, signaling, and pro-
cyclicality hypotheses of Malaysian commercial banks for 
the period 2002-2012. Column 1 reports the results using 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation while 
Column 2 reports the results using the fixed effects 
estimation. Fixed effects estimation controls for the 
unobservable behavior of banks’ specific characteristics,  
 
such as management quality and banks’ policies that may 
affect loan loss provision decisions. As shown in Table 3, 
for OLS estimation, only LLA, EBTP, WO, NPL and 
DCRISIS are statistically significant, while the rest are 
insignificant. This signifies that, CHEBTP, CHLOAN, 
CAP, and GDP do not influence loan loss provisions of 




Predicted  sign 
Dependent variable: 
Loan loss provisions 
 
  OLS Fixed effects 
LLA        - 0.0823*** 
(0.003) 
 
   0.0841** 
   (0.024) 
EBTP        + 0.1819*** 
(0.000) 
   0.2142*** 
   (0.000) 
CHEBTP        + -0.0463 
(0.321) 
 
  -0.0445 
   (0.356) 
CHLOAN        + 0.0017 
(0.763) 
 
  -0.0004 
   (0.929) 
WO        + 0.1078** 
(0.015) 
 
   0.0572 
   (0.245) 
CAP        - 0.0027 
(0.712) 
 
   -0.0022 
   (0.876) 
NPL       + 0.0001** 
(0.035) 
 
   0.0001** 
   (0.036) 
GDP       - -0.0000 
(0.140) 
 
  -0.0000 
   (0.116) 
GFC      -/+  0.0007** 
(0.025) 
 
   0.0008** 
   (0.010) 
_CONS  -0.0015 
 (0.051) 
  -0.0008 
   (0.082) 
 
F-statistic    9.57*** 
(0.0000) 
   5.59*** 
(0.0000) 
R-squared  0.4060   0.3898 
     No. of  
observations 
    136     136 
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The coefficient for beginning LLA is positively 
significant, indicating that banks increase the current 
period loan loss provisions when the previous year loan 
loss allowance is increased. This finding is similar to 
Fonseca and Gonza´lez (2008) and Kanagaretnam et.al 
(2005). A positive and highly significant of EBTP 
indicates that Malaysian banks use loan loss provisions to 
smooth income. This finding contradicts with Shaharudin 
(2004) and Ismail et al., (2005). The evidence of income 
smoothing is consistent with Anandarajan et al., (2007), 
Fonseca and Gonza’lez (2008), Dong et al., (2012), and 
Curcio and Hasan (2013). WO shows a positive and 
significant coefficient with LLP, indicating that banks set 
higher loan loss provisions when loans write-off are high. 
Finally for the financial crisis dummy, the OLS results 
show that GFC is positively and statistically significant 
with the LLP, implying that Malaysian banks put aside 
more loan loss provisions during the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis.  
 
The results for fixed effects estimation are 
consistent with the OLS estimation, except for WO. The 
result for fixed effects analysis shows that WO is 
insignificant although the coefficient is positive. In 
summary, the overall estimations demonstrate that, 
Malaysian banks do smooth income through loan loss 
provisions but there is insufficient evidence to support 
that capital management, signaling and pro-cyclicality 
exist through loan loss provision in Malaysian banks for 
the period 2000-2012. The findings also indicate that 
2007-2009 financial crisis has forced bank managers to 
increase loan loss provisions, most probably to absorb 
losses that are expected to arise from loans default by 
customers. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The objective of this study is to examine to 
examine the evidence of income smoothing, capital 
management, signaling, and pro-cyclical behavior through 
loan loss provisions of Malaysian commercial banks for 
the period 2002-2012. In addition, this study also tests 
whether global financial crisis in years 2007-2009 gives 
an impact to loan loss provisions of Malaysian 
commercial banks. In contrast to Shaharudin (2004) and 
Ismail et al., (2005), the results of this study demonstrate 
that Malaysian commercial banks use loan loss provisions 
to smooth income. As for the capital management, 
signaling, and pro-cyclicality, this study could not find 
concrete evidence to support the existence of those 
activities in Malaysian commercial banks. After 
controlling for 2007-2009 global financial crisis, the result 
shows that loan loss provisions of Malaysian banks are 
influenced by the financial crisis. This probably in line 
with the report by International Monetary Fund (2013); 
Malaysia was not immune to the 2007-2009 global 
economic recession and suffered from a decline in real 
GDP growth for the first quarter of 2009. This might 
explain why banks in Malaysia set higher provisions 
during the crisis – to absorb the high number of expected 
loan losses and hence, reduce the volatility in net income. 
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